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2015 has been a dramatic year in politics in Sri Lanka.  A Presidential as well as 
General Election within the first 8 months of the year and the country saw a new 
President as well as a new government come into power. The new political order 
was brought into power on a wave of mobilisation from a range of civil society groups 
and actors reminiscent of the political transformation that took place in 1994. Then 
too, a government that had been in power for 17 years, who had overseen the violent 
suppression of an insurrection in the South was defeated by a relative new comer 
into politics. This paper attempts to examine the changes that have taken place in 
2015 in relation to certain established facts about Sri Lanka’s political system, 
particularly the dominance and endurance of the elite.  It argues that the focus on 
elite politics as well as the violence resistance against the state by groups such as 
the LTTE and the JVP has resulted in the lack of attention paid to the endurance of 
certain democratic impulses in Sri Lankan society. This is examined in relation to the 
dissent and resistance displayed by smaller groups that played a crucial role in the 
political transformations both in 1994 as well as in 2015.   
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Introduction 
n On the 8th of January 2015 the 
unthinkable happened in Sri 
Lanka: President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, who had called for Presidential 
elections, two years ahead of time, and 
who seemed set to be in power for a 
considerable period (he had earlier 
removed the two term limit on the 
President) was narrowly defeated by a 
relative outsider, Maithripala Sirisena who 
emerged as the Opposition’s Common 
Candidate. Ironically, Maithripala Sirisena 
was the General Secretary of Rajapakse’s 
own party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) and the Minister of Health, when 
he announced his intentions to campaign 
against Mahinda Rajapaksa. In what was 
regarded as a major coup, opposition 
groups had managed to secretly negotiate 
with Sirisena and persuade him to stand as 
the Common Candidate. Campaigning on 
a platform of ‘change’, ‘good governance’ 
and reforms to the Presidential system, 
Maithripala Sirisena managed to hold the 
campaign together and emerge triumphant 
against an extremely formidable opponent.   
Then, if this wasn’t enough for one year, 
President Sirisena dissolved parliament on 
the 26th of June, just about 6 months after 
being elected and called for general 
elections on the 18th of August 2015.  
President Sirisena had appointed former 
Leader of the Opposition and United 
National Party (UNP) leader, Ranil 
Wickramasinghe as Prime Minister soon 
after he won the Presidential Elections.  
But Prime Minister Wickramasinghe was 
leading a minority government and it 
became increasingly clear that the 
promised changes of the ‘new order’ were 
going to be blocked by a largely hostile 
parliament. In a further mind boggling turn 
of events, defeated President, Mahinda 
Rajapakse contested the general elections 
for a parliamentary position from the 
district of Kurunegla1. The general 
election by default became almost another 
contest between the old order and the new, 
except that this time, the coalition that had 
brought Sirisena to power was more or 
less contesting separately along party lines 
at the General Election. The Ranil 
Wickramasinghe led alliance, the 
somewhat grandiloquently named United 
National Front for Good Governance 
(UNFGG), won the General Election on 
the 18th of August. The Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) led United People’s Freedom 
Alliance (UPFA), of which President 
Sirisena was the Leader, emerged with the 
2nd highest number of parliamentary seats.  
Although Sirisena had declared that he 
would stay out of the election campaign, a 
few days before the election, he delivered 
a scathing attack on Mahinda Rajapakse in 
an address to the nation.  In his speech, he 
more or less appealed to the electorate to 
support the forces that had brought him to 
power, which the UNFGG gleefully 
interpreted as a show of support for their 
campaign. In an attempt to gain control of 
the SLFP and the UPFA (of which the 
SLFP was the main party and which had 
been in power since 1994) which had by 
now split along Sirisena and Rajapakse 
factions, the President also sacked the 
                                                
1 The traditional constituency of the Rajapakse 
family is Beliatta in the Hambantota District in the 
Southern Province.  However, since Mahinda 
Rajapakse’s elder brother, Chamal as well as his 
son Namal were contesting from the Hambantota 
District, the former President opted to field his 
candidacy from a different district.   
O 
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General Secretaries of both the SLFP and 
the UPFA who were largely perceived to 
be sympathetic to the former President and 
appointed his loyalists to those positions.  
The new General Secretary of the SLFP, 
Duminda Dissanayake, who was a strong 
supporter of President Sirisena, entered 
into an agreement with the UNP to form a 
national government for two years.  
Consequently, the Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA), which had won 16 seats in 
parliament was declared as the largest 
opposition party by the Speaker, and its 
leader, R.Sampanthan was declared the 
Leader of the Opposition much to the 
consternation of the Rajapakse faction in 
the SLFP and the UNFPA who had 
declared their own intentions of forming 
the main opposition group in parliament.    
Mahinda Rajapakse won his parliamentary 
seat from Kurunegela, but the defeat of the 
UPFA at the General Elections, was seen 
as more or less as an affirmation by the 
electorate of the changes that were 
effected on the 8th of January.   
The events of the first 8 months of 
2015 in Sri Lanka took almost everyone 
by surprise.  The Mahinda Rajapakse 
regime had seemed invincible.  The motley 
crew of unlikely allies that came together 
to field Sirisena as a Common Candidate 
seemed too unwieldy and ideologically 
diverse to be able to hold themselves 
together against such a formidable 
opponent who had little compunctions 
about using every resource the powerful 
Presidency afforded him to fight his 
enemies. The message of ‘good 
governance’ and ‘change’ that framed the 
rhetoric of the Common Candidate and 
subsequently the UNFGG at the General 
Election were seen as too esoteric and 
removed from the everyday concerns of 
the electorate. Ranil Wickramasinghe 
hadn’t won an election in years: how was 
he going to hold this group together and 
win an election? Sceptics declared that 
such campaign slogans would be hard 
pressed to capture the imagination of the 
public against the Sinhala nationalist 
agenda whipped up by the Rajapakse 
regime or to withstand the powerful aura 
of Mahinda Rajapakse who skilfully 
presented himself as the saviour of the 
nation who had brought unity to the 
country by ending the war against the 
LTTE. It was conjectured that Kurunegela 
was strategically chosen for Rajapakse’s 
comeback because of its high percentage 
of military personnel and their families 
who formed the backbone of Rajapakse’s 
Sinhala Buddhist constituency. Yet the 
sceptics were proved wrong. The good 
governance and anti-corruption campaign 
emerged victorious not once, but twice.  
True,  minority communities deserted the 
Rajapakse camp almost whole sale and 
this proved to be a crucial factor in his 
election defeats, yet, the swing away from 
the Rajapakse regime was evident in the 
Sinhala dominated areas of the country as 
well.2  
But signs of opposition and dissent to 
the Rajapakse regime had been evident for 
some time and had been increasing in his 
2nd term as President. The growing dissent 
against the Rajapakse regime was 
organised around a range of seemingly 
unconnected issues: protests against 
reforms to employer benefit schemes in 
the Free Trade Zones, fisher community 
protests against rising fuel prices, farmer 
                                                
2 See www.slelections.lk for the election results 
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protests against regulations regarding 
packaging, university academics on 
funding cuts to education (see Witharana, 
this issue), university students protesting 
the privatisation of education, community 
protests against the lack of clean drinking 
water, resistance to evictions to make way 
for ‘development projects’ in the Colombo 
district, lawyers protesting the 
impeachment of the Chief Justice. 
Notably, these protests were not organised 
or led by political parties.  Opposition 
political parties of course cashed in on 
these protests, but this was usually after 
the event.  The leadership to these protests 
came from civil society individuals and 
groups. Gradually, the exposure of 
massive levels of corruption, excess, abuse 
of power and family nepotism drew these 
diverse protests within the common 
themes of ‘good governance’, abolition of 
the Presidential system and of course 
‘change’. 
As soon as there were indications that 
President Rajapaksa was going to call an 
early Presidential election in January 2015 
(his term of office was due to expire in 
January 2016), it gave rise to furious 
debates in Sri Lanka. A former Chief 
Justice, Sarath Silva dropped a bombshell, 
stating that the incumbent President cannot 
go for a 3rd term, despite the 18th 
Amendment, saying that according to the 
amendment, the term limit is still effective 
and has only  been removed for future 
Presidents3. The Bar Association of Sri 
Lanka conducted a seminar in October 
2014 on this issue where constitutional 
                                                
3 http://asianmirror.lk/news/item/3005-sarath-n-
silva-says-mr-cannot-contest-for-a-third-
term/3005-sarath-n-silva-says-mr-cannot-contest-
for-a-third-term 
experts debated whether the current 
President could seek a 3rd term and also on 
the adverse impact of the Executive 
Presidency on democracy in Sri Lanka4.   
One of the opposition parties, the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), declared that 
any efforts by the incumbent President to 
seek a third term would be 
unconstitutional and that they would do 
their utmost to prevent President 
Rajapakse from seeking a 3rd term5.   
Calls to abolish the Presidential system 
had been intensifying for over a year when 
rumours of a snap Presidential election 
started circulating, particularly, after a well 
known and charismatic Buddhist monk, 
the Rev Maduluwawe Sobitha, formed a 
group, the National Movement for Social 
Justice (NMSJ) which proposed 
constitutional amendments to abolish the 
Presidential system. The NMSJ also 
mooted the idea of a Common Candidate 
who would campaign primarily on the 
issue of abolishing the Presidential system.  
Various names had been proposed as the 
Common Candidate including that of Rev 
Maduluwawe Sobitha; but till November 
2014, when Maithripala Sirisena 
announced his candidacy, it was not clear 
whether the idea of a Common Candidate 
would come to fruition6. Several other 
loosely formed civil society groups also 
organised themselves in support of the 
                                                
4 http://groundviews.org/2014/10/21/do-we-need-
an-alternative-approach-to-the-third-term-question-
beyond-text-and-intention/ 
5 http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-
details&page=article-details&code_title=110948 
6 General Sarath Fonseka, who was one of the key 
architects of the government’s military campaign 
that defeated the LTTE in 2009, had stood as the 
Opposition Common Candidate in the 2010 
Presidential Elections.  After he was defeated he 
was arrested and jailed on charges of treason and 
corruption.   
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Common Candidate and actively 
campaigned during the elections: the most 
prominent among these included the 
Purawesi Balaya (a collective of artists 
and civil society activists), University 
Teachers for Social Justice (UTSJ)  Aluth 
Parapura (a collective of young artists) 
and of course, the National Movement for 
Social Justice led by Rev Sobitha. These 
groups played a crucial role in the 
Presidential campaign organising rallies, 
press conferences and being very active on 
social media in support of the Common 
Candidate.  During the general election, 
their role was more muted since support 
was organised along party lines, yet, their 
core anti-Rajapakse regime message 
proved to be important.   
In this paper I reflect on these events 
of 2015 in relation to certain standard 
narratives about Sri Lanka’s post-
independence polity.  These include the 
idea of a model colony descending into 
chaos post-independence, lurching from 
one crisis to another, the idea of the elite 
dominance of politics in Sri Lanka, the 
endurance of this elite and the impact of 
this elite on the political system in Sri 
Lanka. I begin with a review of the 
literature that has contributed to the 
establishment of this narrative of Sri 
Lanka’s post-independence, especially in 
relation to elite formation. I next examine 
the nature of the state and how certain 
ideas of the state established a particular 
relationship with the citizenry. Finally, I 
will analyse the significance of dissent and 
resistance in how a highly politicised 
society responded to the state even in 
moments of extreme state authoritarianism 
and violence. As I argue in this paper, the 
preoccupation with examining dissent and 
violence through the lens of ethnicity and 
nationalism in Sri Lanka, has meant that 
the importance of dissent and resistance as 
a means through which certain democratic 
impulses in Sri Lankan society have been 
maintained through some very difficult 
times has gone almost un-noticed.  Dissent 
and resistance in Sri Lanka has almost 
always been examined in relation to the 
actions of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) and the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP) and thus primarily 
through the lenses of ethnicity, 
nationalism, youth unrest and violence.  
This has meant that other less spectacular 
forms of dissent and political resistance 
have gone relatively unremarked upon.  
Yet, these forms of dissent and acts of 
political resistance – those of trade unions, 
human rights activists, and similar groups 
have played crucial roles especially in 
critical moments: the elections in 1994 and 
2015 are two such moments. I suggest in 
this paper, that examining these ‘other’ 
forms of dissent and resistance would also 
help resituate the idea of the role of the 
elite in Sri Lanka and also to better 
understand the changes that have taken 
place within the elite in recent times. 
I would like to add a caveat here that 
this paper can hardly do justice to 
examining in depth the breadth and 
substance of dissent and resistance in Sri 
Lankan politics – what I attempt in this 
paper is to draw attention to this area and 
to suggest certain important trends which 
require more analysis and scrutiny.  I also 
admit that I have been influenced 
personally by the political activism of the 
Sri Lankan academic community during 
the last several years, which provided me 
with an opportunity to observe some of 
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this activism at close quarters. What I 
discuss here is therefore also based on 
those observations and experiences and 
reflects some of the intense debates and 
conversations which accompanied that 
period of activism, so eloquently described 
by Dileepa Witharana in this volume.  
 
Elite formation  
The role of the elite in Sri Lankan politics 
has been much discussed in Sri Lanka.  
Scholars such as Michael Roberts (1979, 
1982), Kumari Jayawardene (2000) have 
detailed the process of elite formation in 
Sri Lanka, particularly during the colonial 
period. The dominance of the elites in Sri 
Lanka’s national politics is also fairly well 
established. As pointed out by Mick 
Moore (1985), this is one of the ‘facts’ 
about Sri Lanka’s political system on 
which there is little disagreement.  
Unfortunately, since the 1980s, very little 
empirical work has been done on this 
subject (Spencer 2002).  Consequently, the 
literature is heavily weighted towards the 
comparatively ‘older’ elites with little 
information on the more contemporary 
changes within this group. 
There is also consensus on certain 
features of the elites, whom Moore defined 
as a “relatively homogenous group which 
is dominant in political, economic, social 
and cultural spheres” (1985:206).  
Jayawardene (2000) in particular describes 
how the ‘old’ elites, consisting of a few 
powerful, high caste families who were 
able to maintain their dominant position 
through close collaboration with colonial 
administrators were challenged by the 
members of the emerging capitalist class 
particularly from the coastal belt during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries. The 
rivalry between the ‘old’ elite and this 
emerging capitalist class was a significant 
factor in drawing the political landscape in 
Sri Lanka. Intra-group rivalry and 
competition suggests that the ‘elite’ cannot 
be considered a singular entity, but rather 
group with certain common characteristics.   
Electoral maps and voting patterns were 
usually drawn around networks of elite 
rivalry and patronage (Roberts 1982; 
Moore 1985; Jayanntha 1992; 
Jayawardene 2000). Despite the rivalry, 
family ties as well as common educational 
and professional links meant that the elites 
had many common features which cut 
across the political divide.  These included 
features such as being mainly English 
speaking, familiarity and comfort with a 
life style that the non-elites associated with 
the ‘West’ and urbanisation (Fernando 
1973).  
Moore (1992) takes the discussion of 
elite formation to the time of President 
Premadasa and suggests that during this 
time there was an expansion of the elites to 
accommodate power holders within the 
expanding middle class.  But as pointed 
out by Spencer (2002), Premadasa was 
succeeded by Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, whose ‘old’ elite credentials 
are impeachable. Not only is she the 
daughter of two prime ministers, she 
belongs to a family that had almost a 
monopoly over the supply of ‘native 
officials’ during the colonial period and 
whose members watched with 
considerable alarm and distaste, the 
emergence of a capitalist class which 
threatened and ultimately challenged that 
monopoly (Jayawardene 2000).  Certainly, 
Mahinda Rajapakse, though not in the 
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league of Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga and deliberately projecting 
himself and his family as ‘non-elite’, rural, 
and folksy, also comes from a family that 
has been in politics now for three 
generations. President Premadasa qualified 
as a ‘true’ outsider, and now, President 
Sirisena. But what is evident is that 
especially since President Premadasa’s 
time, the nature of the elites and those who 
hold power has changed.  Those who are 
able to get close to the circles of power, 
especially to the President’s inner circle, 
quite quickly emerge as the new elites.  It 
is this capacity of the elites to expand to 
accommodate new entrants that has partly 
led to its endurance.  
Tissa Fernando (1973) makes a 
distinction between ‘governing elites’ 
(those who wield direct political power) 
and ‘non-governing elites’ (those who do 
not wield direct political power but who 
are closely linked to and influence the 
governing elites).  Fernando also makes 
the point that the resilience and vitality of 
the elites in Sri Lanka can be attributed to 
the fairly open avenues for achieving 
social mobility and entry into elite circles 
through good education and ‘respectable’ 
employment.  But increasingly, obtaining 
a good education and ‘respectable’ 
employment has become harder.  What has 
expanded instead since 1977 especially 
with the introduction of Provincial 
governments, are opportunities for 
entering politics.  Politics has proved to be 
an entry point for accessing economic 
power and also for establishing links to the 
elites.   If not becoming part of the elites, 
then at least having good connections and 
links to the elites can also be useful as we 
will discuss later. 
The election of Maithripala Sirisena, 
who is not from an established political 
family or from among the elite has 
certainly provided a new twist to the story 
of elite formation and dominance.  Neither 
Ranil Wickramasinghe nor Chandrika 
Kumaratunga, who certainly have the elite 
credentials and whose names were floated 
as possible contenders for nomination as 
the Common Candidate, were able to 
generate enough consensus and support to 
clinch the nomination.  It was the outsider, 
Maithripala Sirisena who was able to unite 
the opposition against Mahinda Rajapakse.  
As a close confidant of President Sirisena 
during the elections has revealed in a 
recent book detailing Sirisena’s election 
campaign, the success of President 
Sirisena’s campaign lay in its surprise 
element: the Rajapakse campaign had been 
preparing for Ranil Wickramasinghe’s 
candidacy and were completely shocked 
when Maithripala Sirisena announced his 
candidacy (Abeygoonawrdena 2015)7. At 
the same time, the return of Ranil 
Wickramasinghe as Prime Minister has 
also meant that the old elite continue to be 
in positions of power.  While it is now 
evident that President Sirisena has his own 
circle of advisors and confidants, during 
his election campaign and early days in 
office, former President Kumaratunga was 
considered to be his main advisor. So 
despite the relative outsider status of 
President Sirisena, his ascendency to 
power was very much with the approval 
and support of the elite.   
At the same time, an analysis of the 
kinship relations within the new 
                                                
7 http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/35379  “How 
Maithripala Sirisena became Common Candidate 
without Mahinda Rajapakse Knowing”  
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parliament provides further evidence of the 
endurance of Sri Lanka’s elites or even 
more importantly of the role of kinship in 
maintaining the elites: there are 4 sons of 
former Presidents and Prime Ministers as 
well as the great grand-son of Sri Lanka’s 
first Prime Minister in parliament today.  
There are two father and son 
combinations, siblings, uncles and 
nephews, sons, daughters and widows of 
prominent politicians8.  Another indication 
that the elite network continues to be alive 
and well is the fact that a majority of new 
Cabinet members are from Royal College, 
that elite state Sri Lankan school that has 
produced numerous politicians, 
professionals and other notables9.  
The year 1956 when S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike was elected as Prime 
Minister after forming the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) was considered by 
some as a moment when the ‘rural’ 
Sinhala speaking intelligentsia triumphed 
against the traditional, English educated 
elites. This new group was even 
considered the ‘new elite’ (Geertz 1973; 
Singer 1964).  However, as argued by 
others the old elites have displayed 
remarkable endurance and didn’t quite 
disappear as expected (Jiggins 1979; 
Moore 1985; Spencer 2002).  The Sinhala 
speaking intelligentsia that were the major 
force behind the 1956 election victory for 
S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, didn’t replace the 
existing elites because the power holders 
after 1956 continued to be members of the 
                                                
8 http://www.sundaytimes.lk/150823/news/family-
jewels-on-parade-in-new-parliament-161647.html 
 
9 
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the-
royal-cabinet/ 
 
old elites. The 1956 elections were 
important for other reasons – the rhetoric 
and ideology of Sinhala nationalism 
became far more important in maintaining 
state power.  Thus, it became important for 
the elites in order to maintain their 
position to espouse and advocate certain 
sentiments in public that were in keeping 
with these changes, whatever their private 
opinions may have been.  There is also no 
doubt that the Sinhala speaking 
intelligentsia influenced the state and 
politics in important ways, yet, what is 
significant is how the old elites continued 
to survive.  
What is also interesting about the elites 
in Sri Lanka is not simply their resilience, 
but how they survived in a situation where 
electoral politics were the primary means 
of choosing national leaders. That means 
that elites in order to remain in power had 
to be elected by the masses.  How they 
managed to do this provides many insights 
into state-society relations in Sri Lanka. 
 
The role of elites in mobilising ethno-
religious and linguistic communities 
Understanding the endurance and 
dominance of Sri Lanka’s elites within a 
democratic political system is important.  
Sri Lanka’s (or Ceylon as it was called 
then) reputation as a ‘model colony’ and 
standard bearer for democracy, is closely 
linked to how Sri Lanka gained 
independence from the British.  The 
smooth transfer of power and the non-
violent transition from colony to 
independent state, attracted warm approval 
from the British colonial administrators, 
who oversaw the process, as well as 
British diplomats serving in post-
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independent Sri Lanka. What underscored 
this chorus of approval was how much of 
Britain’s political traditions and culture 
were retained and nurtured by the new 
leadership (Moore 1992; Kumarasingham 
2014). The eagerness to reproduce 
Britain’s political traditions and culture 
meant that Sri Lanka’s national leadership 
was extremely cautious and conservative 
about reform.  This caution was reflected 
initially within the colonial leadership as 
well. As representative institutions and 
forms of government matured, logically, 
members should have been elected to these 
positions. However, calls for reform of the 
Legislative Council were resisted for many 
reasons. The colonial administration was 
afraid that it would dilute their power.  
Furthermore, in their view, political 
concessions should be preceded by 
improvement in the education and literacy 
of the population. A significant point in 
the favour of the colonial administration 
was that there was no mass agitation for 
political reform. Also, efforts to elect 
members were resisted for the longest time 
by the elites who feared that elections 
would result in their displacement. Not 
only did the elites not agitate for political 
reform, they actively resisted it on many 
occasions (de Silva 2008; de Alwis and 
Jayawardena 2001). The elites were quite 
satisfied with a limited franchise: among 
an educated, particularly English educated 
elite.  When the introduction of universal 
franchise was broached in the 1920s, the 
elites (particularly, the males) were quite 
horrified at the thought of women 
receiving the franchise. However, 
universal franchise was granted in 1931 
despite resistance from the elites (de Alwis 
and Jayawardena 2001)10.   Eventually, the 
Executive and Legislative Councils were 
replaced by the State Council to which 
members had to be elected. 
One of the consequences of this was 
that political mobilisation in Sri Lanka 
during the colonial period was quite 
passive unlike what was happening for 
instance in India.  The elites in Sri Lanka, 
especially the Sinhala elites were more 
interested in agitating for access to the 
bureaucracy and administration hitherto 
dominated by the British rather than 
political reform.  This didn’t require a 
mass movement which would have 
required the national leadership to appeal 
to the masses for support.  However, mass 
mobilisation did take place around other 
issues that were often linked to ethno-
religious issues.  An early example of such 
mobilisation was the Temperance 
Movement11. Also, mobilisation also took 
place around various religious revival 
movements, especially the Buddhist 
revival movement.  These movements had 
within them a component of anti-
colonialism, but the primarily ethno-
religious nature of these movements meant 
that the core demands were for recognition 
and the restoration of rights along ethno-
religious identities, rather than for broader 
legislative reforms. As representative 
government became a reality for Sri 
                                                
10 There was however a strong women’s franchise 
movement among educated and wealthy women 
including support from an emerging Labour 
Movement (See de Alwis and Jayawardena 2001) 
11 The Temperance Movement was launched in the 
late 19th century initially by Christian missionaries 
and organizations.  It was eventually taken over by 
Buddhist activists giving the movement a distinct 
Buddhist identity.  The movement was not without 
political overtones since many involved used the 
movement to articulate anti-colonial opinions (de 
Silva 2008). 
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Lanka, political leaders were quick to 
apprehend the power of mobilisation 
around identity.  S.W.R.D Bandaranaike in 
particular was adept at mobilising the 
feelings of marginalisation and exclusion 
based on ethnic and religious identity that 
was festering particularly among the 
majority Sinhala Buddhist community who 
felt that the minorities had been given 
special consideration by the colonial 
powers (Manor 1979). Independence was 
expected to restore the Sinhalese 
Buddhists to their ‘rightful’ position in the 
country. So from the early days of 
enfranchisement, political mobilisation 
around ethno-religious and linguistic lines 
was established. 
But how do we explain the enduring 
dominance of elites in Sri Lanka? Why 
would the non-elites continue to tolerate 
their dominance, especially with the 
introduction of democratic institutions and 
processes with the experience of decades 
of universal suffrage? The efficacy of 
ethno-religious and linguistic mobilisation 
alone does not explain elite dominance in 
Sri Lanka. 
 
The ‘ideal’ state mediated by patronage 
Despite the reluctance and hesitation of the 
ruling elites, representative government 
and universal franchise was introduced to 
Sri Lanka and by the time of independence 
fully established. As pointed out by 
Venugopal (2011) electoral reforms in Sri 
Lanka paralleled the construction of a 
large, social democratic state. The 
legitimacy of this state centred around the 
provision of free health, free education, 
rural development, protection of 
Buddhism, primacy of place to the Sinhala 
language and importantly, employment in 
the public sector, which was a primary 
source of social mobility for many 
(Venugopal 2011; Amarasuriya 2011).  
The strength of this notion is such that 
even in the face of economic liberalisation, 
privatisation and market reforms since 
1977, successive governments have dared 
not openly distance itself from any of the 
responsibilities of a social democratic 
welfare state.  This has meant that the state 
plays a huge role in ensuring many 
resources for its citizens.   As important or 
even more important perhaps as actually 
providing resources is to be seen to be 
doing so.  This is something ruling elites 
in Sri Lanka have understood very well.   
For example, since 1977, education 
has been to all intents and purposes, 
subjected to privatisation despite the 
official policy of ‘free education’. While 
previously, the majority of schools were 
government financed and managed, with 
very few, private schools, which had been 
established by missionaries and which 
were allowed to continue as privately 
managed establishments, today, the 
network of state schools is being 
overshadowed by ‘International Schools’ 
of all shapes and sizes which offer English 
medium education and are registered under 
the Board of Investment as private 
companies. Furthermore, the deterioration 
of the quality in state schools due to 
resource constraints and other problems 
plus the increasingly competitive nature of 
education has resulted in the establishment 
of a massive private tuition culture.  
Almost all school children from a very 
young age attend ‘tuition’ classes which 
are basically structured to coach children 
to succeed at several key public 
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examinations.  A recent National Youth 
Survey revealed that almost 34% of school 
children attend tuition classes even during 
school time suggesting that tuition has 
taken precedence over school attendance 
(NHDR 2014).  Consequently, private 
spending on education has increased 
considerably. Yet, successive governments 
pledge their commitment to protecting and 
promoting ‘free education’. For example, 
the election manifesto of President 
Rajapaksa when he ran for his first term in 
2005, states unequivocally, “I will not 
deprive our children of their right to free 
education” (2005:72). The election 
manifesto of Maithripala Sirisena as well 
as that of the UNFGG and the JVP at the 
general elections promised to allocate 6% 
of GDP for education in line with the 
demand made by the Federation of 
University Teachers’ Associations 
(FUTA) during their 2012 trade union 
action (Witharana, this volume).   
An interesting exception where the 
government in power did not pay much 
attention to maintaining this rhetoric, was 
when the UNP won the general elections 
in 2001 and came into power ushering in a 
period of uneasy ‘co-habitation’ with 
parliament under the control of one party 
and the President from a different party.  
During this time, all opposition groups 
united to resist the ‘neo-liberal’ reform 
agenda of the UNP.  The UNP’s inability 
at that time to resist the accusation of 
bringing in aggressive neo-liberal reforms 
as well as the liberal peace process it was 
pursuing which was as easily labelled as 
undermining the sovereignty of the 
country, led to its defeat in the 2004 
general elections. The 2004 elections 
reinforced the currency of the rhetoric of 
the social democratic welfare model as 
well as Sinhala nationalism. To this day, 
Ranil Wickramasinghe, the leader of the 
UNP struggles against the label of a 
‘traitor’ who undermined the country’s 
sovereignty and whose economic policies 
are dictated to by the World Bank and 
IMF. His inability to ‘read the pulse of the 
people’ is seen as the primary reason for 
his successive electoral defeats since 2004.  
His appointment as Prime Minister in the 
‘National Government’ created after the 
victory of Maithripala Sirisena after the 
2015 Presidential Elections, has revived 
these old labels. The target of pro-Mahinda 
Rajapaksa groups in parliament and 
outside has continued to be Ranil 
Wickramasinghe. Accusations that the 
country’s sovereignty is once again under 
threat, and that Sri Lanka is sliding 
towards becoming a ‘puppet’ of the West, 
led by the US feature prominently in the 
rhetoric used by these groups12. 
That this ideal of a social democratic 
welfare state persists despite its rapid and 
steady dismantling under successive 
governments during the past several 
decades is an issue worthy of close 
examination.  The period of market reform 
and economic liberalisation has seen 
economic inequality and disparities widen 
sharply in Sri Lanka despite economic 
growth (World Bank 2004; Gunatilaka and 
                                                
12 However, Ranil Wickramasinghe seems to have 
finally learned the importance of being seen as pro-
people.  The UNFGG’s election campaign this time 
was filled with people-friendly, welfare oriented 
measures and a ‘rebranding’ of its neoliberal 
economic policies as based on something called the 
‘social market economy’ which is ostensibly a 
combination of economic competitiveness and 
social justice.  See 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/76735/next-5-years-
economic-policy-in-the-making-harsha 
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Chotikapanich 2006; NHDR 2012).  There 
has been a steady cut back of state 
investment in health, education and social 
welfare (UNDP 2012; 2014).  So it would 
seem that the old system used by the elites 
to keep the masses happy was under severe 
strain despite the rhetoric.  Neither can we 
assume that the mass of people, the non-
elites are delusional and were simply 
hypnotised by the rhetoric of social 
security and state protection to blindly 
follow a system which fails to deliver.   
Venugopal (2011) has shown how 
rising military employment, particularly 
among an important demographic of rural, 
Sinhala males created socio-political 
stability by cushioning the effects of 
widening disparities in the South.  The 
North and East, which were of course 
badly affected by the conflict, were more 
or less left out of reckonings of national 
economic data and lag far behind the rest 
of the country. However, there are also 
regions in the South, such as the Uva 
Province, which continue to have high 
rates of poverty and deprivation (NHDR 
2012; 2014).  Venugopal argues that rising 
military expenditure “compensated for the 
contraction of the State due to market 
liberalisation, and thus made the reform 
agenda politically viable” presenting a 
powerful analysis of the link between the 
conflict and market driven economic 
reform in the South of the country 
(Venugopal 2011: 68). 
But there is also another factor which 
is equally important: and that is the 
importance of patronage and links to the 
elites in being able to access resources.  
The fact that patron-client relationships are 
a key factor in Sri Lanka’s political system 
is also an accepted ‘fact’ about Sri Lanka 
(see for instance Dilesh Jayanntha 1992).   
As social protection and welfare measures 
were steadily dismantled, links to the elites 
in order to be able to access resources 
became even more important.  Accessing 
limited public sector jobs, getting a child 
into a prestigious schools, jumping the 
queue in a state hospital, getting the 
necessary license or simply being allowed 
to bend the rules increasingly depends on 
having those important connections and 
links. 
The absolute importance of such links 
is beautifully illustrated in the following 
story related to me by a colleague.  While 
campaigning on behalf of the JVP in the 
district of Negombo during the general 
elections in 2015,  he said that people had 
told him that although they were very 
impressed by the JVP and their integrity, 
lack of corruption and dedication, they 
would not vote for the JVP.  When he had 
asked why, the reply had been that if the 
JVP came into power in their area, they 
would lose their livelihoods, since the JVP 
would not tolerate illegal sand-mining 
activities13! Though unsaid, what was 
implied was that this was not going to be a 
problem with the other political parties. 
This story also helps to explain the JVP’s 
inability to capture more parliamentary 
power through the election process.  In 
recent times and especially in the last two 
elections in Sri Lanka, the JVP’s strong 
campaigns, their performances in the 
media, their reputations for fearlessly 
exposing corruption and abuse of power, 
the integrity and ‘clean’ image of their 
members had lifted their image with the 
public. The JVP was no longer simply 
                                                
13 Personal communication, Nirmal Ranjith 
Dewasiri, university academic 
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brushed aside as a group of angry, militant 
youth. Their campaign rallies attracted 
vast crowds and in a context where other 
opposition parties, especially the UNP 
struggled to find the kind of charismatic 
speakers so important for holding 
successful election rallies in Sri Lanka, the 
JVP’s campaigns were critical for taking 
the message of the opposition campaigns 
to the public.  Even though the JVP did not 
officially join the Common Candidate’s 
campaign (they did not appear on stage 
with other opposition groups) they 
campaigned independently to defeat the 
Rajapakse regime. At the general elections 
too they went alone, and there were high 
expectations of a substantial increase in 
their parliamentary share.  In fact, the JVP 
campaigned specifically for the role of the 
Opposition party.  Yet, the results fell way 
short of expectation – while the JVP had 
managed to increase their voter share at 
the election, they only ended up with 6 
seats.  
It is perhaps conceivable that one of 
the reasons why people do not vote for the 
JVP is precisely the explanation provided 
to my colleague by the community in 
Negombo, explained above. The JVP’s 
structure and modus operandi is at odds 
with the kind of patronage politics that 
people have come to expect from 
politicians. The JVP would not (or are 
seen as not being willing to) operate on the 
terms that people have come to expect 
from politicians. 
 
The humane and benevolent elites 
What does all of this mean?  So while we 
maintain superficially the ideas of 
representative government, a social 
democratic state where the citizen or the 
beneficiary of development determines all 
– the rituals and practices of politics serve 
to maintain a different story: that of a 
benevolent leader (or many leaders, 
positioned within a strict hierarchy) who 
have the power to access and distribute all 
manner of resources among a grateful 
populace. There is a blurring between 
individual and the state: for example, 
when the President or a Minister 
distributes drought relief or even letters of 
appointment for jobs, it is done so in an 
elaborate ritual, which often includes the 
recipient falling down on his or her knees 
to respectfully acknowledge the ‘gift’.  
The fact that such ‘gifts’ are given through 
public money raised through taxes or loans 
doesn’t get mentioned.  It is enacted and 
accepted as a benevolent gesture of an 
individual political figure who has access 
to and controls the distribution of 
resources. This engenders a very personal 
link between the citizen and ruler. This 
also means that those with the right 
connections will have better access to 
resources than those who do not.  
Patronage rather than political ideology or 
policies becomes the source of power 
(Kumarasingham 2014). 
The private sector, which was expected 
to be the ‘engine of growth’ post 1977 is 
not any less immune from the practices of 
patronage.  One of the features of elites in 
Sri Lanka is the way in which their social 
and political networks cut across sectors 
and categories.  Political power and private 
capital are closely aligned through family 
and social networks. This situation is 
further exacerbated by the fact that 
economic growth and especially private 
sector expansion has been limited very 
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much to the prosperous Western Province, 
and specifically the Colombo district, 
meaning that the Sri Lankan private sector 
is mostly an urban based, middle class, 
cosmopolitan phenomenon.  Employment 
for example in the private sector is 
determined largely by the right social 
connections and social background.  In the 
National Youth Survey of 2013, youth had 
identified ‘family background’ as one of 
the key criterion for employment in the 
private sector (NHDR 2014).   The coming 
together of private capital and political 
power was one of the key features of the 
Rajapakse regime and which allowed 
many members of the elite to comfortably 
coexist with the regime despite its 
increasingly authoritarian nature: the elites 
through their links to the regime were 
spared its authoritarianism as long as they 
remained loyal to the regime.   
 
Dissent and resistance 
So far my story has not veered far from the 
established narrative on Sri Lanka’s polity.  
It reconfirms that one of the greatest 
paradoxes about Sri Lankan polity has 
been its ideological commitment to a 
social democratic welfare state, while 
actual state-society relations have been 
mediated through an intricate arrangement 
of social and political connections and 
elite patronage. The quality of a citizen’s 
experience of the state depends largely on 
the degree to which he or she is networked 
with those in power.  In a colloquial sense, 
who you know, in Sri Lanka is absolutely 
critical at many levels: your security, your 
access to resources, your very survival can 
depend on those connections and the 
extent to which these can be mobilised on 
your behalf. 
This has of course been resisted or 
challenged. The JVP led youth 
insurrections in 1971 and subsequently in 
the period 1987 to 1990 centred on ideas 
of exclusion and injustice perpetrated by 
the state.  Youth in the South took up arms 
against the state on both occasions, 
primarily because they were fighting to 
establish a better state: one that was more 
responsive to their needs.  Jayadeva 
Uyangoda (2003) has argued in this regard 
that youth insurrections in Sri Lanka have 
not so much been anti-state as counter 
state: youth were fighting to establish an 
alternative state. This is not very unlike 
what Tamil groups in the North and East 
were seeking to do as well. The 
Presidential Youth Commission which was 
established in 1991 to examine the causes 
of youth unrest, argued strongly for ‘de-
politicisation’ of the public sector, 
especially with regard to obtaining 
employment in the public sector, as one of 
its key recommendations (Presidential 
Commission on Youth 1991).  In 2013, 
more than two decades after the 
Presidential Youth Commission, youth 
continue to identify ‘political connections’ 
as the main means of obtaining 
employment in the public sector (NHDR 
2014). However, as pointed out by 
Spencer (2002) the role of “perceived 
distributive injustice” and the “distribution 
of power and resources” within the polity 
have not received much academic attention 
in understanding the Sri Lankan polity 
(2002:93). 
Yet in many ways, the ethnic conflict 
as well as the JVP youth insurrections in 
Sri Lanka could be viewed as moments 
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when the frustrations with the non 
fulfilment of the expectations and 
aspirations from a social democratic 
welfare state were expressed by different 
demographic groups. One group, 
articulated it in terms of ethnic exclusion, 
while the other, more in terms of socio-
economic exclusion. It is worth 
remembering also that in the early stages 
of the rise of the JVP as well as of Tamil 
militant movements, there was quite a lot 
of interaction between the two groups as 
well as a more explicit Marxist orientation 
within both movements. Of course, 
eventually, the LTTE’s dominance of the 
Tamil militant movement took it in a more 
Tamil nationalist direction, whilst the JVP 
also became more stridently Sinhala 
nationalist. 
But while the resistance of dissent and 
resistance from the LTTE and the JVP is 
well documented albeit primarily through 
the lenses of ethnicity, nationalism and 
youth unrest, the critical role played by 
other groups such as trade unions, 
independent political activists, artists, 
women’s groups and human rights 
activists in fighting the erosion of 
democratic values and social justice is less 
well known. The role played by these 
groups has been particularly important on 
two occasions:  in 1994 when President 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunage 
came into power on a wave of resistance 
against the UNP, and then again in 2015, 
when President Maithripala Sirisena 
gained power.  What is also unique about 
these groups is that they mobilised the 
public not along ethno-religious or 
linguistic lines. Their political activism 
and campaigning were based on issues of 
human rights, democracy and social 
justice. Many who provided leadership to 
civil society resistance were those who 
were not perhaps directly affected by the 
strains to the social democratic structures 
of the state or sources of social and 
economic mobility. The recent elections 
saw a broad alliance of civil society groups 
ranging from trade unions, artists, 
academics, professional groups such as 
lawyers, clergy and human rights 
defenders campaigning strongly on behalf 
of the Common Candidate. Their demands 
were for constitutional reform, greater 
democracy and accountability from the 
state and a more progressive political 
culture. It is also significant that the 
resistance against the Rajapakse regime 
initially came from these groups – the 
resistance started at a time when the 
Opposition was in a battered and bruised 
state. Post-war Sri Lankan society is 
marked by a resurgence of resistance and 
protests from a range of actors making the 
field of protest complicated and in some 
ways even polarised (Amarasuriya 2015).  
Yet, there is no doubt that the resurgence 
of a culture of protest and dissent fed into 
the campaign for reform, social justice and 
good governance that eventually led to the 
downfall of the Rajapakse regime in 2015.   
So what is the composition of these 
dissenting groups?  Perhaps, one way to 
think about them is to use Tissa 
Fernando’s terms of ‘non-governing elites’ 
(Fernando 1973). If we take the 
composition of the prominent groups that 
played a role in the two elections in 2015, 
the leading members of these groups were 
educated professionals and artists. This 
group was largely responsible for 
articulating the various protests by 
farmers, fishermen, Free Trade Zone 
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workers, academics and lawyers as 
symptomatic of a problem of governance 
and an undemocratic state.  They provided 
the ideological weight for the growing 
protests, drawing patterns and trends 
between the various groups, using the 
protests to critique the practices of the 
state. They were mostly (but not 
exclusively) from the Sinhala speaking or 
perhaps bi-lingual (Sinhala and English) 
intelligentsia, and more cosmopolitan and 
urbanised than the Sinhala speaking 
intelligentsia that was mobilised in 1956. 
In Fernando’s analysis, one of the 
characteristics of ‘non-governing elites’ is 
that they are motivated to preserve elite 
dominance.  Yet, both in 1994 and 2015, 
the ‘non-governing elites’ played a crucial 
role in bringing about political change.  Of 
course, another term to be used for this 
group could be ‘civil society’ – and this is 
indeed how they are commonly identified 
or identify themselves.  The overlaps 
between civil society in Sri Lanka and the 
‘non-governing elite’ is perhaps another 
area worthy of investigation.  
Perhaps what this also points to is that 
despite the endurance and resilience of the 
elites and their manipulation of the state to 
establish patronage networks in order to 
maintain their dominance, the impact of 
years of actual participation in democratic 
processes cannot be easily dismissed. As 
Spencer (2002) says, the democratic 
impulse and the nationalist sentiments that 
were released, exploited and manipulated 
since independence by the elites do not 
always, remain under the control of its 
supposed elite masters. Nor can the elites 
themselves fully escape from its 
consequences. 
However, it is important when drawing 
parallels between 1994 and 2015 to keep 
one thing in mind: in 1994, when 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga 
came into power, President Premadasa had 
been assassinated by suspected LTTE 
suicide bombers.  Yet, the regime after 
President Jayawardene is indelibly 
associated with President Premadasa and 
his excesses and abuse of power.  But 
President Premadasa was always 
considered an ‘outsider’.  The situation in 
2015 was somewhat different in that 
President Rajapakse cannot be considered 
an ‘outsider’. He has been succeeded by an 
outsider. When comparing 1994 and 2015, 
rather than simply looking at the change in 
power at the top, what would be more 
useful is to look at the changes that took 
place within the ‘non-governing elites’. 
But a word of caution before we conclude 
that the era of elite dominance and 
patronage is on its wane in Sri Lanka.  
When we examine closely the period 
immediately after 1994 and the current 
post election phase in 2015, there is yet 
another startling similarity: that is, many 
groups and individuals who led the 
protests and resistance that influenced the 
political changes, can be found in 
positions of power and authority in the 
new government. They are heading the 
think-tanks, the committees and the new 
commissions established by the 
government. Tissa Fernando in his 
somewhat acerbic piece that I have 
referred to earlier, states that ‘non-
governing elite’ share most of the fringe 
benefits of the governing elite, the benefits 
and privileges not available to the masses.  
He then goes on to analyse how elites 
manage mass resistance. According to 
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Fernando the stifling of radicalism in Sri 
Lanka is possible precisely because mass 
leaders can be ‘bought over’ or 
‘bourgeoisified’: as Fernando puts it 
somewhat sarcastically “….no mass leader 
of Ceylon has so far resisted the lure of a 
chauffeur driven official limousine or an 
air-conditioned office” (1973:376).  
Fernando argues that this process of 
cooption of potential trouble makers into 
the ranks of the elite is a tactic used by Sri 
Lanka’s elite to manage resistance to their 
dominance. 
I would like to use this idea of 
cooption to argue that it is not so much a 
cooption of mass leaders into elite ranks, 
but rather the cooption of potential trouble 
makers among the ‘non-governing elite’ 
through their integration into the ranks of 
government that has been the most 
formidable means of preserving the 
dominance of the ruling elite.  As we saw 
in how the state dealt with the JVP or the 
LTTE, mass leadership can be eliminated 
through the use of violence. In many ways 
it can be argued that the ruling elites pretty 
much remain in power in various guises: it 
is the non-governing elite whose 
dominance is less assured. For instance, 
Mahinda Rajapakse, his son and his 
brother remain in parliament.  In fact, the 
MOU between the SLFP and the UNP 
actually means, that they are part of the 
‘national’ government.  The changes that 
take place after an event of significant 
political transformation (as in 1994 and 
2015) are actually in the ranks of the ‘non-
governing elite’. The various university 
academics, businessmen and professionals 
who headed state departments, 
commissions and committees during the 
Rajapakse regime are no more.  These 
have all been replaced by a new set of 
people, drawn largely from those who 
gave leadership in the build up to the 
events of 2015. For example, the new 
Chairman of the Board of Investment is 
the former President of the BASL who led 
the protest campaign against the 
impeachment of the Chief Justice in 2013.  
The public are well aware of this as well.  
Rev Maduluwawe Sobitha complained that 
ever since the change of government in 
2015 he has been plagued by requests for 
interceding on behalf of transfers, school 
admissions, jobs, medical attention etc.  
On my first day back at university after the 
elections in January, I was stunned into 
silence when a university casual worker, 
asked me if it was possible for me to put in 
a word with the necessary authorities to 
make her position permanent! Yet, we 
cannot simply dismiss the significance of 
the changes that took place in 1994 and 
2015 as just moments of shifts in the ranks 
of the elite or in the composition of the 
elite.  The changes in 1994 as well as in 
2015 even for a brief few years, 
considerably opened up the democratic 
space in Sri Lanka, provided opportunities 
for strengthening democratic processes 
and institutions.  In 2015 for instance, 
while the Presidential system has not been 
abolished, its powers have been 
considerably reduced. Independent 
commissions overseeing human rights, 
public services, the police have been set 
up.  The Bribery Commission has been 
reconstituted so that it is able to function 
more independently. 
 
Conclusion 
Although the LTTE and the JVP are seen 
as the main forces of mass resistance to the 
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state and reflective of attempts to 
transform the Sri Lankan political system 
to a more just system, both in 1994 and 
2015, change and transformation was 
brought about electorally at a time when 
the leaders of violent resistance had been 
crushed. In 1994, when Chandrika 
Bandaranike Kumartunga came into power 
the JVP leadership which had been wiped 
out during President Premadasa’s time was 
just beginning to come together again.  
They had just begun to re-establish 
themselves and managed to win one 
solitary seat in parliament from the 
Hambantota district at the 1994 general 
elections.   Since then, the JVP has 
eschewed violence and has transformed 
itself into a parliamentary political party 
and has been campaigning at each election 
with varying results.  In 2015, the LTTE 
which had up to 2010 played a critical role 
in influencing the Tamil electorate and 
indeed the trajectory of politics in general, 
was no more.  During both periods, the 
state had ostensibly eliminated any 
resistance it had to face.   
Yet, leading up to 1994 and 2015, was 
a strong public sense of severe crisis in the 
very survival of the state and the future of 
democracy in Sri Lanka. Despite the state 
having emerged victorious over its armed 
opponents, it was looking a bit ragged at 
the edges. Both in 1994 and 2015 the state 
seemed incapable of controlling or 
managing the violence it had unleashed 
against its opponents of coming back to 
haunt its very existence and survival.   
Nevertheless, in both instances, it was 
possible for Sri Lanka to pull back from 
the edge of the precipice and reinvent itself 
on a message of transformation and hope.   
Could this have been possible if the large 
mass of people in Sri Lanka were totally 
indifferent to democratic values and 
institutions? 
The notion that Sri Lankan society is 
highly politicised is another ‘fact’ about 
which there is little disagreement (Moore 
1982).  Elections are held regularly and 
voter turn outs are generally over 70% and 
often higher at national elections.  Voter 
turnout at the Presidential elections in 
2015 was around 80% and at the 
parliamentary elections 8 months later, 
around 77%14. Political leaders are 
household names. Media content 
emphasises political news. During election 
times, electronic media features political 
debates that go on till late at night and are 
watched avidly.  Newspaper commentaries 
on politics and political news are eagerly 
read.  Intense discussions and debates on 
politics take place in offices, public 
transport, wayside tea-shops and homes.  
In the 2015 election, social media proved 
to be another source of political 
commentary especially among young 
people15.  Surely, these are not 
characteristics of either a passive or docile 
populace that has been lulled into 
compliance by a manipulative elite. 
It is important that the political 
maturity of Sri Lankan society and the 
long tradition of democracy in Sri Lanka 
are not underestimated.  The focus on the 
many crises since independence and the 
notion of the ‘model’ colony and 
democracy lurching into disaster has in 
                                                
14 www.slelections.lk  
15 See for instance, 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/82315/tracking-the-mr-
effect-through-social-media; 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/85811/social-media-and-
general-elecations-2015 
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some ways missed perhaps an equally 
salient point: Sri Lanka has also displayed 
a remarkable ability to pull itself out back 
from the precipice on more than one 
occasion.  While not in any way under 
estimating the seriousness of the 
difficulties facing Sri Lankan polity and 
society, it is equally important to pay 
attention to its resilience and also its 
capacity to pull the proverbial rabbit out of 
the hat to at least survive till the next crisis 
hits.  It is in this regard, that the role of 
small forms of dissent and resistance 
deserves far more attention. 
Also, the narrative of elite dominance 
and endurance needs to be re-examined in 
the light of the substantial changes that 
have taken place in Sri Lanka in the last 
several decades.  While patronage politics 
and elite dominance certainly have not 
been eliminated, the relationship between 
the elites and the masses is perhaps far 
more complex than the existing 
scholarship acknowledges. The role of 
‘non-governing elites’, the expanding 
middle class, the emergence of a ‘civil 
society’ all need to be taken into account 
in understanding Sri Lanka’s polity and its 
fraught relationship with democracy and 
democratic institutions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the ‘International Conference 
on the States of South Asia’ organised by 
the Institute for South Asian Studies 
(ISAS) of the National University of 
Singapore held from the 13th -14th of 
November 2014. The paper was 
substantially revised to incorporate the 
events that took place in Sri Lanka since 
then and also in response to extremely 
useful comments from two anonymous 
reviewers. I am grateful for comments 
received at the conference, from the two 
reviewers and colleagues in Sri Lanka for 
pointing out many gaps and ways of 
improving the paper. 
At the time of finalizing this paper, Sri 
Lanka is recovering from the sudden death 
of Rev Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero, that 
charismatic and powerful Buddhist monk 
who led the National Movement for Social 
Justice. He was provided with a state 
funeral with full honours and thousands of 
people paid their last respects to him in a 
turn out not seen recently. Delivering a 
speech at his funeral, President Sirisena 
pledged to carry forward the monk’s 
vision for good governance by eliminating 
the Executive Presidency, brining about 
electoral reforms and addressing 
corruption.   
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